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Abstract	  -­‐	  Net	  neutrality	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  concept	  in	  which	  Internet	  service	  providers	  
are	   obliged	   to	   treat	   all	   data	   streams	   equally,	   independent	   of	   which	   application,	  
service,	  device,	   sender	  or	   receiver	   is	   involved.	   They	  are	  as	   such	   forbidden	   to	  block,	  
throttle	   or	   alter	   data	   traffic	   over	   their	   networks.	   The	   current	   debate	   about	   net	  
neutrality	  raises	  important	  questions	  about	  if	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  implemented	  by	  
law.	  This	  research	  summarizes	  the	  current	  regulations	  regarding	  net	  neutrality	  in	  the	  
EU	  and	  US	  and	  finds	  significant	  differences,	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  cases	  where	  operators	  
breached	  (or	  tried	  to	  breach)	  the	  concept	  of	  net	  neutrality.	  A	  case	  study	  about	  video	  
on	  demand	  is	  used	  to	  analyze	  both	  these	  violations	  and	  certain	  approaches	  under	  net	  
neutrality	   in	  order	   to	   see	  which	   scenario	  offers	   the	  greatest	  benefits,	  both	   from	  an	  
operator’s,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  a	  regulator’s	  perspective.	  The	  results	  are	  computed	  using	  
a	  game	  theoretic	  approach	  and	  from	  these	  results	  recommendations	  are	  subtracted	  
that	   can	   be	   presented	   to	   regulators.	   The	   study	   finds	   that	   net	   neutrality	   can	   be	  
enforced	  by	  law	  to	  prevent	  the	  decline	  of	  competition	  and	  innovation	  on	  the	  market.	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1 An	  introduction	  to	  net	  neutrality	  
The	  Internet	  is	  an	  ubiquitously	  available	  platform	  for	  information,	  entertainment	  and	  
communication.	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  position	  of	   ISPs	  (Internet	  Service	  Providers)	  has	  
become	   one	   of	   an	   essential	   gatekeeper,	   which	   puts	   them	   in	   control	   of	   the	  
information	  flow	  on	  the	  web.	  Net	  neutrality	  (NN)	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  concept	  in	  which	  
ISPs	  are	  obliged	  to	  treat	  all	  data	  streams	  equally,	   independent	  of	  which	  application,	  
service,	  device,	  sender	  or	  receiver	  is	  involved.	  They	  are	  as	  such	  not	  allowed	  to	  block,	  
throttle	  or	  alter	  data	  traffic	  over	  their	  networks.	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  Over-­‐The-­‐Top	  (OTT)	  
applications	  and	  providers,	   a	   significant	  amount	  of	   Internet	   traffic	   is	  no	   longer	   fully	  
controlled	   by	   the	   ISPs.	   The	   increase	   in	   Internet	   traffic	   that	   these	   OTT	   applications	  
bring,	  demands	  for	  upgrades	  to	  the	  network,	  but	  does	  not	  return	  a	  direct	  revenue	  for	  
the	   ISPs.	  This	   issue	   lies	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   current	  debate	  about	  net	  neutrality	   and	  
raises	  important	  questions	  about	  if	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  implemented	  by	  law	  [1].	  
1.1 US	  regulations	  
The	   Federal	   Communications	   Commission	   (FCC)	   tried	   in	   various	   ways	   to	   impose	   a	  
certain	   level	   of	   NN	   to	   the	   US	   telecommunications	   market.	   This	   section	   presents	   a	  
brief	  overview	  of	  the	  developments	  of	  the	  regulations	  in	  the	  US.	  
The	   Communications	   Act	   of	   1934	   divided	   the	   electronic	   communications	   into	  
different	   types	   of	   services.	   The	   ones	   that	   matter	   to	   the	   Internet	   are	   information	  
services	  (Title	  I)	  and	  telecommunication	  services	  (Title	  II).	  Every	  service	  categorized	  as	  
a	   Title	   II	   service	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	   common	   carrier,	   and	   can	   hence	   be	   regulated	   by	  
competition	  law	  and	  the	  FCC.	  Title	  I	  services	  stand	  in	  sharp	  contrast,	  as	  the	  FCC	  there	  
has	   little	   or	   no	   regulatory	   power.	   Originally,	   the	   backbone	   ISPs’	   services	   were	  
regarded	   as	   information	   services,	   but	   the	   access	   ISPs	   services	   were	   categorized	   as	  
telecommunication	   services.	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   deregulation	   measures,	   this	  
categorization	   changed	   in	   2005,	   by	   classifying	   Internet	   access,	   when	   bundled	   with	  
Internet	  services,	  as	  an	  information	  service.	  As	  such,	  the	  access	  ISP	  market	  was	  also	  
left	  fairly	  unregulated	  [2].	  
Following	   some	   specific	   discriminatory	   practices	   (see	   also	   section	   1.3),	   where	   the	  
rulings	   of	   the	   FCC	   were	   found	   out	   of	   scope	   (the	   FCC	   cannot	   regulate	   information	  
services),	   the	   FCC	   decided	   to	   follow	   a	   different	   path.	   In	   2010,	   they	   published	   the	  
Open	   Internet	   Ruling,	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   implement	   stricter	   NN	   rules	   for	   the	   fixed	  
broadband	  market.	   This	   proposal	   was	   overturned	   by	   the	   courts,	   which	   led	   to	   long	  
legal	   discussions	   between	   the	   FCC	   and	   the	   affected	   operators.	   In	   February	   2015,	  
finally,	   the	   lingering	   uncertainty	   was	   ended	   when	   the	   FCC	   adopted	   “strong,	  
sustainable	   rules	   to	   protect	   the	   open	   Internet”	   [3].	   In	   short,	   the	   rules	   can	   be	  





- No	  Blocking:	  ISPs	  may	  not	  block	  lawful	  content,	  applications,	  services	  or	  non-­‐
harmful	  devices,	  subject	  to	  reasonable	  network	  management.	  
- No	   Throttling:	   ISPs	  may	   not	   impair	   or	   degrade	   lawful	   content,	   applications,	  
services	  or	  non-­‐harmful	  devices,	  subject	  to	  reasonable	  network	  management.	  	  
- No	   Paid	   Prioritization:	   ISPs	   shall	   not	   accept	   payment	   (monetary	   or	   non-­‐
monetary)	  to	  set	  up	  “fast	  lanes”	  for	  specific	  content.	  
These	   rules	   apply	   to	   both	   fixed	   and	  mobile	   broadband	   for	   residential,	   commercial	  
purposes,	  known	  as	  “broadband	  Internet	  access	  services”.	  Hence,	  enterprise	  services,	  
virtual	   private	   network	   services	   and	   hosting	   or	   data	   storage	   services	   are	   excluded.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  broadband	  Internet	  access	  services	  are	  now	  classified	  under	  Title	  II,	  
albeit	   regulated	  using	   a	   “light-­‐touch	  approach”	   (excluding	  unbundling	   the	   last	  mile,	  
tariffing,	  rate	  regulation	  and	  cost	  accounting	  rules).	  
1.2 EU	  regulations	  
In	  the	  EU,	  NN	  has	  not	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  until	  2009,	  most	  probably	  because	  
no	   clear	   examples	  of	   critical	  NN	   infringements	  were	   visible	  until	   then.	   The	   growing	  
number	   of	   regulatory	   reforms	   in	   the	   USA,	   Japan	   and	   Canada,	   and	   the	   growing	  
number	  of	  consumer	  complaints	  about	  ISP	  malpractices	  made	  the	  NN	  debate	  emerge	  
in	   the	   European	   Commission	   [5].	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   US,	   Europe	   consists	   of	   several	  
separate	   telecom	  markets,	  each	   regulated	  by	   its	  own	  National	  Regulatory	  Authority	  
(NRA).	  	  
In	   2009,	   the	   European	   Commission	   introduced	   a	   new	   regulatory	   framework	   for	  
electronic	   communications.	   In	   this	   framework	   the	   first	   real	   NN	   directives	   were	  
included.	  These	  directives	  concerned	  [6]:	  
- Transparency	  about	  traffic	  management	  
- Facilitation	  of	  end	  user	  switching	  between	  ISPs	  
- Empowerment	  of	  the	  NRAs	  to	  impose	  a	  minimum	  Quality	  of	  Service	  (QoS),	  if	  
necessary	  
In	  September	  2013,	   the	  EC	  proposed	  a	  draft	  version	  on	  new	  regulations	  concerning	  
the	  European	  single	  market	   for	  electronic	  communications.	  These	  regulations	   try	   to	  
harmonize	  the	  electronic	  communications	  market,	  therefore	  also	  the	  NN	  regulations.	  
This	  proposal	  is	  often	  referred	  as	  a	  middle	  way	  solution	  since	  it	  enables	  operators	  to	  
prioritize	  specialized	  services,	  but	  preventing	  ISPs	  from	  blocking	  or	  throttling	  all	  types	  
of	  content.	  This	  prioritization	   is	   furthermore	  only	  allowed	  if	   it	  does	  not	  degrade	  the	  
QoS	   of	   other	   services.	   After	   adapting	   a	   few	   parts	   of	   the	   proposal,	   e.g.	  making	   the	  
definition	   of	   specialized	   services	   stricter,	   the	   European	   Parliament	   adopted,	   on	   the	  
3th	  of	  April	  2014,	  this	  proposal	  in	  a	  first	  reading	  [7].	  This	  adoption	  by	  the	  Parliament	  





is	  complicated	  by	  the	  three-­‐way	  dance	  between	  the	  presidency	  (Latvia	  currently),	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  European	  Commission.	  
The	   current	   draft	   regulation	   [8]	   still	   focuses	   on	   the	   “end-­‐users’	   right	   to	   access	   and	  
distribute	   content	   of	   their	   choice”,	   as	  well	   as	   “ensure	   that	   companies	   that	   provide	  
Internet	   access	   treat	   traffic	   in	   a	   non-­‐discriminatory	  manner”.	   However,	   and	   this	   in	  
sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  US-­‐adopted	  rule	  on	  paid	  prioritization,	  the	  current	  EU	  proposal	  
allows	  for	  “agreements	  on	  services	  requiring	  a	  specific	  level	  of	  quality”.	  
1.3 Recent	   examples	   of	   net	   neutrality	   breaches	   define	   the	  
research	  scenarios	  of	  this	  paper	  
The	  current	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  debates	  about	  net	  neutrality	  clearly	  show	  that	  
there	   is	  no	  consensus	   if	  and	   to	  what	  extent	  net	  neutrality	   should	  be	   imposed	  upon	  
ISPs.	  This	  paper	  aims	  at	  investigating,	  in	  a	  quantitative	  way,	  how	  the	  involved	  telecom	  
providers	  and	  the	  market	  in	  general	  can	  be	  influenced,	  when	  NN	  obligations	  or	  non-­‐
NN	  conditions	  are	   imposed.	  This	  section	  defines	  different	   research	  scenarios,	  based	  
on	   net	   neutrality	   obligations	   and	   recent	   events	   where	   operators	   proposed	   (and	  
sometimes	   implemented)	  measures	   conflicting	  with	  net	  neutrality.	  Please	  note	   that	  
the	   specific	   scenario	   of	   total	   blocking	   of	   an	   OTT	   application	  will	   not	   be	   taken	   into	  
account:	  no	  market	  share	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  the	  OTT,	  so	  no	  competitive	  game	  can	  be	  
played.	  
1.3.1 Scenario	  1:	  Basic	  net	  neutrality	  
The	  first	  scenario	  is	  a	  benchmark	  scenario;	  the	  network	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  saturated	  in	  
the	   beginning	   of	   the	   study	   period,	   each	   increase	   in	   traffic	   demand	   will	   result	   in	  
congestion	   problems.	   As	   network	   neutrality	   is	   assumed,	   bandwidth	   is	   evenly	  
distributed	  across	  players.	  
1.3.2 Scenario	  2:	  Network	  upgrade	  under	  neutrality	  
In	   the	   second	   scenario,	   NN	   is	   again	   assumed,	   thus	   distributing	   bandwidth	   evenly	  
across	   players,	   but	   congestion	   problems	   are	   lifted	   because	   the	   ISP	  will	   upgrade	   its	  
network.	  This	  network	  upgrade	  is	  modeled	  following	  the	  network	  upgrade	  performed	  
by	  Telenet	  (the	  Flemish	  cable	  operator),	  who	  increased	  bandwidths	  by	  node	  splitting	  
[9].	  
1.3.3 Scenario	  3:	  Service	  access	  fee	  
By	   installing	  Deep	  Packet	   Inspection	   (DPI)	   equipment,	   the	   ISP	   is	   able	   tot	  detect	   the	  
different	  traffic	  flows	  for	  different	  applications.	  If	  the	  use	  of	  specific	  OTT	  applications	  
is	  identified,	  the	  ISP	  can	  charge	  the	  end	  user	  an	  extra	  fee	  for	  using	  these	  services	  over	  
its	  network.	   This	   scenario	   is	   based	  on	   the	  proposal	   of	   the	  Dutch	   ISP	  KPN	   to	   charge	  
customers	   extra	   for	   the	   use	   of	   Voice	   over	   IP	   (VOIP)	   and	   Instant	   Messaging	   (IM)	  





applications	  such	  as	  Skype	  and	  WhatsApp,	  which	  it	  wanted	  to	  counter	  by	  introducing	  
new	  tariffs	  in	  which	  customers	  would	  pay	  extra	  to	  use	  these	  applications.	  In	  response	  
there	  was	  a	  motion	  voted	  by	  parliament	  to	  include	  net	  neutrality	  into	  law,	  making	  the	  
Netherlands	  one	  of	  the	  first	  countries	  to	  have	  an	  explicit	  net	  neutrality	  law.	  Another,	  
very	  similar,	  example	  can	  be	   found	   in	  Spain,	  where	   the	   ISP	  Yoigo	  wanted	   to	  charge	  
extra	  for	  the	  use	  of	  Skype	  [11].	  
1.3.4 Scenario	  4:	  Dominant	  ISP	  
This	   scenario	   is	   based	   on	   the	   case	   of	   Deutsche	   Telekom,	   the	   German	   ISP,	   who	  
announced	   in	   2013	   that	   they	   switched	   from	   unlimited	   access	   to	   fixed	   data	   caps,	  
whereby	  traffic	  generated	  by	  DT’s	  own	  services	  would	  not	  count	  (or	  not	  fully	  count)	  
towards	  these	  data	  caps	  [12].	  	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  argued	  that	  a	  clear	  distinction	  must	  
be	  made	  between	  net	  neutrality	   and	   free	   Internet:	  DT’s	   television	   service	  was	  paid	  
for	  separately,	  hence	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  counted	  in	  the	  Internet	  cap	  [13].	  In	  the	  end,	  
a	  court	  ruling	  prevented	  the	  action.	  
Other	  examples	  of	  ISP	  dominance	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  [14].	  The	  US	  ISP	  
Comcast	   deliberately	   slowed	   down	   the	   Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer	   application	   BitTorrent,	   in	   both	  
peak	  and	  low	  demand	  hours.	  Bell	  Canada	  slowed	  down	  the	  Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer	  traffic	  of	  its	  
own	   customers	   during	   peak	   hours,	   but	   decided	   to	   also	   apply	   the	   throttling	   on	   the	  
traffic	  of	  the	  virtual	   ISPs,	  because	  congestion	  problems	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  solved.	  
The	  Canadian	  regulator	  here	  allowed	  the	  network	  management	  because	  Bell	  Canada	  
could	  prove	  that	  the	  freed	  bandwidth	  was	  used	  for	  other	  time-­‐sensitive	  applications,	  
and	  network	  management	  for	  all	  ran	  ISPs	  alike.	  
The	   fourth	   scenario	   studied	   in	   this	   paper	   assumes	   that	   the	   ISP	   will	   prioritize	   his	  
customers	   first,	   and	   allocate	   only	   what	   is	   left	   to	   the	   OTT	   customers.	   This	   will	   of	  
course	  result	   in	  huge	  congestion	  problems	  for	  the	  OTT.	  As	   in	  the	  third	  scenario,	  DPI	  
equipment	  is	  needed	  for	  network	  management	  and	  traffic	  recognition	  goals.	  
1.3.5 Scenario	  5:	  Preferential	  Distribution	  Fee	  
The	   fifth	   and	   final	   scenario	   is	   based	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   “fast	   lane”,	   to	   which	  
customers	   paying	   a	   higher	   fee	   are	   allocated.	   As	   such,	   those	   preferential	   customers	  
will	   receive	   higher	   capacities	   for	   their	   services.	   The	   OTT	   can	   choose	   to	   buy	   any	  
remaining	   capacity	  on	   this	   fast	   lane	   for	   the	   same	   fee.	  Normal	   customers	  will	   suffer	  
more	   congestion.	   This	   scenario	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   AT&T’s	   aspirations	   to	   give	  





2 A	   game-­‐theoretic	   model	   to	   simulate	   the	   outcome	   for	  
operator	  and	  regulator	  
In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  above-­‐described	  scenarios	  on	  both	  the	  outcome	  
for	   the	   operators	   (ISP	   and	   OTT,	   in	   terms	   of	   Net	   Present	   Value	   –	   NPV)	   and	   for	   the	  
regulator	  (in	  terms	  of	  market	  uptake),	  a	  game-­‐theoretic	  approach	  is	  combined	  with	  a	  
market	  model.	  This	  section	  will	  describe	  the	  different	  calculation	  steps	  of	  the	  model	  
in	  more	  detail,	  and	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  parameters	  used.	  
2.1 Insights	  in	  the	  modeling	  approach	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Overview	  of	  the	  game-­‐theoretic	  model	  
As	   shown	   in	   Figure	   1(a),	   each	   scenario	   requires	   to	   determine	   the	   players	   (one	   ISP,	  
one	  OTT	  in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  paper)	  and	  their	  respective	  strategies	  (e.g.	  charge	  high	  or	  
low	  price).	  For	  each	  combination	  of	  strategies,	  the	  outcome	  for	  the	  market	  should	  be	  
determined	   (Figure	   1(b)).	   Afterwards,	   game	   theory	   can	   be	   used	   to	   determine	   the	  
equilibriums	  of	  the	  game,	  which	  indicate	  the	  preferred	  strategies	  of	  both	  players	  in	  a	  
competitive	   setting.	   This	   section	   will	   explain	   the	   different	   steps	   of	   the	   modeling	  
approach	  in	  more	  detail.	  
For	  each	  scenario,	  players	  and	  strategies	  need	  to	  be	  determined.	  The	  players	  are	  the	  
same	   for	   each	   scenario:	   the	  market	   consists	   of	   one	   ISP	   and	   one	  OTT.	   Both	   players	  
have	  the	  same	  choice	  of	  strategies:	  they	  can	  set	  a	  high	  VOD	  or	  a	  low	  VOD	  price.	  	  
For	   each	  player-­‐strategy	   combination,	   the	  outcome	   in	   terms	   of	   NPV	   and	   available	  
market	  need	  to	  be	  calculated.	  A	   first	   step	   in	   this	  process	  consists	  of	  calculating	   the	  
congestion	   cost.	   In	   this	   paper,	   the	   congestion	   cost	   is	  modeled	   as	   an	   artificial	   price	  
increase	   that	   reflects	   the	   lower	   degree	   of	   customer	   satisfaction.	   The	   amount	   of	  
congestion	  is	  calculated	  using	  an	  exponential	  function	  that	  depends	  on	  a	  comparison	  
between	  the	  needed	  bandwidth	  per	  person	  and	  the	  available	  bandwidth	  per	  person.	  
This	   amount	   of	   congestion	   is	   scaled	   to	   a	   cost	   between	   zero	   (available	   bandwidth	  
equals	   needed	   bandwidth)	   and	   double	   the	   normal	   VOD	   price	   as	   a	  maximum	   point	  





Willingness	   to	   Pay	   by	   comparing	   the	   normal	   VOD	  price	   to	   the	   “actual”	   VOD	  price,	  
which	  includes	  the	  congestion	  cost.	  	  
In	  a	  next	  step,	   the	  market	  model	  must	  determine	  the	  market	   shares	  per	  player,	  as	  
the	   number	   of	   VOD	   customers	   each	   player	   serves	   directly	   impact	   the	   players’	   cost	  
and	   revenue	   structure,	   and	   hence	   their	   NPV.	   The	   different	   calculation	   steps	   of	   the	  
market	   model	   are	   shown	   in	   Figure	   2.	   The	   distribution	   of	   the	   customers	   generally	  
occurs	  in	  four	  phases	  [16]:	  
1. The	  total	  number	  of	  customers	  that	  will	  subscribe	  to	  one	  of	  the	  players	  must	  
first	   be	   calculated.	   This	   number	   depends	   on	   the	   determined	  Willingness	   to	  
Pay	  (determined	  above)	  and	  the	  price	  elasticity	  of	  the	  VOD	  market.	  This	  first	  
step	  thus	  calculates	  the	  overall	  growth	  (or	  shrinkage)	  of	  the	  VOD	  market.	  
2. Next,	   from	   this	   total	   market,	   the	   free	   market	   is	   derived.	   The	   free	   market	  
represents	   all	   customers	   that	   are	   “free”	   to	   choose	   a	   new	   provider,	   and	   is	  
calculated	   as	   the	   sum	   of	   the	   new	   customers	   (of	   course	   only	   in	   case	   of	   a	  
growing	  market)	  and	  the	  churning	  customers	  (those	  that	  change	  provider).	  
3. By	   defining	   the	  market	   division,	   the	   free	  market	   can	   be	   distributed	   to	   the	  
different	  offers,	  resulting	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  market	  shares	  for	  all	  offers.	  
There	  are	  different	  strategies	  for	  defining	  this	  market	  division.	  The	  most	  well	  
known	  probably	  is	  ‘The	  Winner	  Takes	  All’.	  However,	  in	  reality,	  it	  hardly	  ever	  is	  
the	  case	  that	  one	  supplier	  captures	  the	  entire	  free	  market.	  It	  will	  most	  likely	  
be	   the	   case	   that	   the	   best	   offer	   captures	  most	   of	   the	  market,	   but	   all	   other	  
offers	  can	  still	  attract	  market	  share.	  Still,	  the	  demand	  of	  each	  service	  or	  good	  
will	  still	  be	   impacted	  by	  the	  price	  of	  the	  other	  offers.	   In	  economics,	  such	  an	  
effect	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  cross-­‐price	  elasticity	  of	  demand.	  
4. In	  a	   final	  step,	  the	  relative	  market	  division	  can	  be	  used	  to	  distribute	  all	   free	  
customers	   among	   the	   players,	   thereby	   determining	   each	   player’s	   customer	  
base.	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Overview	  of	  the	  calculation	  steps	  in	  the	  market	  model	  
A	   final	   step	   in	   the	   calculations	   for	   each	   strategy	   combination,	   is	   determining	   the	  
outcome	   per	   player	   by	   calculating	   its	   NPV	   or	   actual	   market	   uptake.	   These	  
parameters	   were	   chosen	   to	   represent	   the	   operators’	   perspective	   (NPV,	   i.e.	  
maximizing	  profit)	  and	  the	  regulator’s	  perspective	  (market	  uptake,	  i.e.	  maximizing	  the	  
number	   of	   satisfied	   customers).	   The	   NPV	   is	   calculated	   based	   on	   both	   costs	   and	  
revenues	  for	  both	  players,	  which	  depend	  on	  the	  chosen	  scenario	  (see	  section	  3).	  The	  






Once	   the	   outcome	   for	   all	   strategy	   combinations	   has	   been	   calculated,	   game	   theory	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	   the	  equilibriums,	   i.e.	   the	  best	  strategies	   for	  both	  players	  
[17].	  The	  model	   in	   this	  paper	  calculates	  both	  Nash	  and	  Pareto	  equilibriums.	  A	  Nash	  
equilibrium	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   no	   player	   can	   gain	   by	   unilaterally	  
changing	   its	   strategy.	   A	   change	   to	   a	   different	   strategy	   combination	  making	   at	   least	  
one	   player	   better	   off	   without	   making	   another	   actor	   worse	   off	   is	   called	   a	   Pareto	  
improvement.	  When	  no	  Pareto	  improvements	  can	  be	  made	  from	  a	  given	  strategy	  set,	  
the	  set	  is	  Pareto	  optimal	  or	  efficient.	  
2.2 Overview	  of	  used	  input	  data	  
The	   results	   that	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   this	   paper	   are	   based	   on	   a	   case	   study	   for	   the	  
Flemish	  market,	  in	  which	  the	  Belgian	  cable	  operator	  Telenet	  (ISP)	  competes	  with	  the	  
new	  entrant	  Netflix	  (OTT)	  for	  the	  VOD	  market.	  The	  used	  parameters	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
Table	  1.	  The	  subscription	  fees	  reflect	  the	  difference	   in	  VOD	  charges	   for	  Telenet	  and	  
Netflix	   (the	   OTT	   subscription	   fees	   are	   significantly	   lower),	   the	   Internet	   charges	   are	  
based	  on	  a	  Telenet’s	  basic	  Internet	  offer.	  As	  we	  assume	  the	  OTT	  is	   just	  entering	  the	  
market,	  its	  initial	  market	  share	  is	  0%,	  while	  the	  ISP	  holds	  the	  entire	  available	  market	  
at	  the	  start	  of	  our	  study	  (100%).	  
Table	  1:	  Overview	  of	  parameter	  values	  for	  the	  Flemish	  case	  study	  
Parameter	   Value	  
Number	  of	  households	  (Flanders)	   2,083,828	  	  
Needed	  bandwidth	  for	  VOD	   4.5Mbps	  
Subscription	  fee	  for	  Internet	   €300	  per	  year	  
Subscription	  fee	  for	  VOD	  (OTT)	   €108	  per	  year	  
Subscription	  fee	  for	  VOD	  (ISP)	   €240	  per	  year	  
Price	  elasticity	  VOD	  market	   -­‐1,39	  
Cross-­‐price	  elasticity	  VOD	  market	   1,08	  
Churn	  in	  VOD	  market	   35%	  per	  year	  
Start	  penetration	  VOD	  market	   40%	  	  
Start	  market	  share	  in	  VOD	  market	  (ISP)	   100%	  
Start	  market	  share	  in	  VOD	  market	  (OTT)	   0%	  
Service	  access	  fee	   10%	  of	  VOD	  subscription	  fee	  
Operational	  expenses	  for	  access	  network	  (ISP)	   €94	  million	  per	  year	  
	  
In	  each	  scenario,	  both	  players	  can	  assume	  strategies	  based	  on	  pricing:	  they	  can	  set	  a	  
high	  or	  a	  low	  price.	  Given	  the	  difference	  in	  price	  setting	  in	  the	  real	  market,	  this	  paper	  
makes	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  low	  price	  for	  the	  ISP	  equals	  the	  high	  price	  for	  the	  OTT,	  





For	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   DPI	   equipment	   installation,	   the	   cost	   for	   this	   specific	  
equipment	   is	   calculated	   using	   an	   ECMN	   (Equipment	   Coupling	   Modeling	   Notation)	  
model	  [18].	  The	  different	  cost	  inputs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  1.	  
Parameter	   Value	  
Processor	   €853	  
Memory	  chip	   €74	  
Switch	  manager	  processor	   €58	  
Ethernet	  multilayer	  switch	   €5400	  
Chassis	   €7700	  
Rack	  cabinet	   €551	  
Technician	   €20	  per	  hour	  
Energy	  cost	   €900	  per	  year	  
3 Comparing	   the	   scenarios	   on	   Net	   Present	   Value	   and	  
market	  uptake	  
After	  having	  detailed	  the	  model	  and	  the	  case	  under	  study,	   this	  section	  will	  describe	  
the	  results	  for	  the	  different	  scenarios	  identified	  in	  section	  1.3.	  These	  results	  indicate	  
the	  preferred	  strategies	  for	  both	  ISP	  and	  OTT	  operators	  in	  the	  different	  scenarios,	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   preferred	   outcome	   for	   the	  market	   (and	   hence	   the	   regulator).	   In	   a	   first	  
section,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  benchmark	  “basic	  net	  neutrality”	  scenario	  will	  be	  discussed	  
in	  detail,	  after	  which	  the	  following	  scenarios	  will	  be	  compared	  to	  this	  benchmark.	  	  
3.1 Basis	  net	  neutrality	  	  
This	   scenario	   is	   characterized	   by	   net	   neutrality	   without	   network	   upgrades:	   the	  
available	   bandwidth	   is	   evenly	   distributed	   among	   ISP	   and	   OTT	   customers,	   but	   the	  
limitations	   of	   the	   network	   lead	   to	   sharp	   increases	   in	   congestion,	   hence	   congestion	  
cost.	   The	   game	   matrix	   outcome	   for	   this	   scenario	   is	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3.	   The	   Nash	  
equilibrium	  for	  both	  the	  NPV	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  customers	  are	  shown	  in	  grey,	  while	  
the	  Pareto	  equilibriums	  are	  represented	  in	  bold.	  The	  high	  prices	  are	  indicated	  by	  the	  
letter	  ‘H’,	  the	  low	  prices	  by	  ‘L’.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  The	  game	  matrix	   for	   the	  basic	  NN	  scenario	  shows	  different	  equilibriums	   for	   the	  operators’	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The	   Nash	   equilibrium	   for	   the	   NPV	   shows	   that,	   for	   maximizing	   both	   players’	   profit	  
simultaneously,	  the	  ISP	  will	  opt	  for	  the	  high	  price,	  the	  OTT	  for	  the	  low	  price.	  This	  can	  
be	  explained	  by	  revisiting	  the	  start	  assumptions:	  the	  ISP	  starts	  the	  competitive	  game	  
in	   a	   monopoly	   position	   (controlling	   the	   entire	   available	   market),	   thus	   gains	   the	  
maximum	  number	  of	  revenues	  by	  charging	  the	  highest	  price.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
OTT	   setting	   its	   price	   as	   low	   as	   possible	   results	   in	   a	   maximum	   attraction	   of	   free	  
customers.	   The	   amount	   of	   customers	   the	   OTT	   gains	   by	   following	   this	   strategy	  
increases	   his	   revenues	   more	   than	   adopting	   a	   higher	   price	   and	   attracting	   fewer	  
customers.	  This	  monopoly	  start	  assumption	  also	  explains	  the	  higher	  absolute	  NPV	  for	  
the	  ISP.	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Customer	  distribution	  under	  basic	  net	  neutrality,	  in	  the	  NPV	  equilibrium	  where	  the	  ISP	  sets	  a	  
high	  price	  and	  the	  OTT	  assumes	  a	  low	  price	  
When	   investigating	   the	  customer	  distribution	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  congestion,	  Figure	  4	  
shows	  that	  the	  strategy	  combination	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  NPV	  equilibrium	  has	  a	  negative	  
effect	  on	  the	  overall	  market	  uptake.	  By	  charging	  the	  highest	  price,	  the	  ISP	  will	  achieve	  
the	  highest	  NPV	  on	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years,	  but	   looses	  each	  year	  all	   free	  customers	  to	  
the	  OTT.	  As	   such,	   the	  high-­‐price	  strategy	   taken	  by	   the	   ISP	  can	  be	  good	   in	   the	  short	  
run,	   but	   the	   increase	   in	   congestion	   (and	   hence	   total	   –	   artificial	   –	   VOD	   subscription	  
fee)	   will	   in	   the	   end	   lead	   to	   an	   over-­‐expensive	   offer.	   Although	   the	   overall	   trend	   in	  
market	  uptake	   for	   this	   scenario	   is	  decreasing,	   the	   first	  year	  gives	  an	   increase	   in	   the	  
total	  market	  uptake.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  average	  price	  for	  the	  
VOD	  offer	  is	  lowered	  when	  the	  OTT	  player	  enters	  the	  market	  (see	  subscription	  fees	  in	  
Table	  1).	  
The	  uptake-­‐maximizing	  equilibrium	  (from	  a	  regulator’s	  	  perspective)	  is	  achieved	  when	  
















































the	  congestion	  significantly	  increases	  the	  subscription	  fees,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  reach	  as	  
many	  customers	  as	  possible	  (offer	  a	  subscription	  below	  or	  equal	  to	  their	  Willingness	  
to	  Pay),	  is	  to	  limit	  the	  charged	  prices.	  This	  impact	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5.	  
	  
Figure	  5:	   Total	  market	  uptake	  evolution	  of	   the	   years	   for	   the	  different	   strategic	   combinations	   in	   the	  
basic	  net	  neutrality	  scenario	  
3.2 Network	  upgrade	  under	  neutrality	  
The	   second	   scenario	   under	   study	   assumes	   net	   neutrality	   but	   eliminates	   the	  
congestion,	   as	   it	   assumes	   the	   ISP	   upgrades	   the	   network	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   higher	  
bandwidth	  demand.	  The	  game	  matrix	  with	  both	  NPV	  and	  market	  uptake	  equilibriums	  
is	   shown	   in	  Figure	  6,	   the	  comparison	  with	   the	  basic	  NN	  scenario	   for	  market	  uptake	  
and	  customer	  distribution	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7.	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  The	  game	  matrix	  for	  the	  network	  upgrade	  scenario	  shows	  the	  same	  equilibriums	  as	  for	  the	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Figure	  7:	  Total	  market	  uptake	  and	  customer	  distribution	  evolution	  for	  the	  network	  upgrade	  and	  basic	  
NN	  scenarios,	  strategic	  combination	  ISP	  high,	  OTT	  low	  
Because	  of	   the	  network	  upgrade,	   the	   total	  market	  uptake	  will	   increase.	  This	  has	  an	  
impact	   on	   the	   NPV	   outcome	   for	   both	   players:	   the	   NPV	   for	   the	   ISP	   will	   be	   slightly	  
lower	  because	  of	  the	  investment	  in	  the	  network	  upgrade,	  while	  the	  NPV	  for	  the	  OTT	  
will	  be	  slightly	  higher	  because	  of	  the	  higher	  customer	  uptake.	  The	  NPV	  for	  the	  ISP	  is	  
still	   positive,	  we	   can	   thus	   assume	   that	   its	   current	  market	   share	   is	   sufficient	   to	   pay	  
back	  the	  network	  investment.	  
Because	  of	   the	   absence	  of	   congestion,	   this	   scenario	   retains	   the	   full	   customer	  base.	  
The	   Nash	   equilibriums	   however	   do	   not	   change	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   basic	   NN	  
scenario.	  From	  comparison	  with	  the	  basic	  NN	  game	  matrix	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  
ISP	   under	   net	   neutrality	   regulations	   will	   rather	   drop	   its	   price	   than	   invest	   in	   the	  
network,	  since	  that	  strategy	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  higher	  NPV.	  
3.3 	  Service	  access	  fee	  
In	   this	   scenario,	   the	   ISP	   will	   install	   DPI	   equipment	   to	   identify	   OTT	   customers	   and	  
charge	  them	  an	  extra	  fee	  of	  10%	  on	  top	  of	  the	  VOD	  subscription	  fee.	  The	  bandwidth	  
is,	  as	  in	  both	  scenarios	  above,	  still	  evenly	  shared	  among	  players.	  The	  game	  matrix	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  Figure	  8.	  	  
The	   game	   matrix	   logically	   returns	   the	   same	   HL	   strategic	   combination	   as	   Nash	  
equilibrium.	  A	  higher	  price	  results	  in	  higher	  service	  access	  fees	  and	  reduces	  the	  price	  
difference	  between	  the	  ISP	  and	  the	  OTT.	  Therefore,	  the	  ISP	  will	  not	  only	  retain	  more	  
customers,	  but	  will	  also	  recover	  revenue	  from	  the	  OTTs	  customers.	  A	  lower	  price	  will,	  
however,	  provide	  a	  greater	  increase	  in	  the	  overall	  market,	  but	  it	  already	  became	  clear	  
from	  the	  basic	  network	  neutrality	  scenario	   that	   this	   increase	   in	  customers	  does	  not	  



















































Figure	  8:	  The	  game	  matrix	  for	  the	  service	  access	  fee	  scenario	  shows	  again	  the	  same	  equilibriums	  as	  for	  
the	  basic	  NN	  scenario	  
3.4 Dominant	  ISP	  
This	   scenario	   starts	   from	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   legislation	   does	   not	   impose	  
neutrality.	   The	   ISP	   can	   thus	   distinguish	   data	   streams	   by	   installing	   DPI	   equipment.	  
Here,	   the	   ISP	   asserts	   his	   power	   and	   dominates	   the	   OTT	   by	   favoring	   its	   own	  
customers.	   This	  practice	   increases	   the	   congestion	   for	   the	  OTT	   customers,	  while	   the	  
congestion	  for	  the	  ISP	  remains	  minimal.	  
	  
Figure	  9:	  The	  game	  matrix	  for	  the	  dominant	  ISP	  scenario	  shows	  a	  disastrous	  outcome	  for	  the	  OTT	  
The	   results	   of	   the	   game	  matrix	   still	   show	   the	   same	  equilibriums,	   but	   now	   show	  an	  
extreme	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  uptake	  (Figure	  9).	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
amount	  of	  congestion	  the	  OTT	  experiences	  from	  the	  second	  year	  onwards,	  which	  is	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  fully	  saturated	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  study	  period.	  
Once	  the	  OTT	  comes	  in,	  the	  market	  potential	  will	  grow	  due	  to	  the	  lower	  average	  price	  
and	  the	  saturated	  market	  will	  become	  congested	  (Figure	  10).	  As	  the	  ISP	  gives	  priority	  
to	  its	  own	  customers,	  there	  is	  no	  more	  bandwidth	  left	  for	  the	  OTT	  to	  use.	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	   customers	   of	   the	   OTT	   will	   receive	   an	   offer	   of	   unacceptable	   quality	   (very	   high	  
congestion	  cost)	  and	  will	  unsubscribe	  or	  join	  the	  ISP.	  This	  scenario	  thus	  results	  again	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Figure	  10:	   The	   customer	  distribution	  evolution	   shows	   that	   in	   the	  dominant	   ISP	   scenario	   the	  market	  
will	  evolve	  again	  to	  a	  monopoly	  
3.5 Preferential	  Distribution	  Fee	  
The	  fifth	  and	  final	  scenario	   is	  characterized	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “fast	   lane”.	  The	   ISP	  
divides	  the	  available	  bandwidth	  into	  two	  lanes.	  The	  first	  lane	  (containing	  50%	  of	  the	  
bandwidth)	   will	   be	   used	   for	   normal	   best-­‐effort	   traffic,	   while	   the	   second	   lane	  
(managed	  lane,	  also	  50%	  of	  bandwidth)	  will	  be	  used	  for	  those	  customers	  that	  pay	  an	  
additional	   fee.	   In	  order	   to	  distinguish	  between	  customers,	   the	   ISP	  again	   installs	  DPI	  
equipment.	   The	   OTT	   has	   the	   choice	   to	   also	   offer	   its	   customers	   a	   preferential	  
treatment,	   for	   the	   same	   price	   as	   the	   ISP.	   However,	   in	   case	   the	   managed	   lane	   is	  
congested,	  the	  ISP	  customers	  will	  get	  service	  first.	  
	  
Figure	   11:	   The	   game	   matrix	   for	   the	   preferential	   distribution	   fee	   scenario	   again	   shows	   the	   same	  
equilibriums	  
The	  game	  matrix	  (Figure	  11)	  shows	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  outcome	  for	  both	  players.	  The	  
increased	  congestion	  for	  the	  “normal”	  customers	  has	  a	  –	  limited	  –	  negative	  effect	  on	  
the	  total	  market	  uptake.	  
3.6 Comparison	  of	  all	  scenarios	  
After	   having	   studied	   all	   scenarios	   separately,	   this	   section	   compares	   the	   equilibrium	  
outcome	  for	  all	  of	  them.	  Figure	  12	  shows	  the	  results	  for	  both	  the	  NPV	  and	  the	  market	  
uptake	   targets,	   where	   again	   the	   Nash	   equilibrium	   is	   indicated	   in	   grey,	   the	   Pareto	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Figure	  12:	  Nash	  and	  Pareto	  equilibriums	  results	  for	  all	  scenarios	  
If	   the	   ISP	   is	   left	   a	   choice	   of	   scenario,	   he	   will	   pick	   the	   dominant	   ISP	   scenario.	   The	  
equipment	   cost	   for	  DPI	   installation	   is	   insignificant	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   increase	   in	  
VOD	  income	  and	  hence	  easily	  paid	  by	  the	  ISP.	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  ISP	  will	  make	  the	  
OTT	  leave	  the	  market.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  regulator,	  this	  is	  by	  far	  the	  worst	  
scenario:	   the	   scenario	   returns	   to	   a	  monopoly	  market	   while	   the	   regulator	   wants	   to	  
stimulate	  and	  preserve	  competition.	  	  
The	  strategic	  combination	  of	  prices	  is	  the	  same	  in	  each	  scenario.	  The	  ISP	  will	  stick	  to	  
the	  high	  price	  because	  of	  its	  high	  initial	  market	  share,	  while	  the	  OTT	  will	  choose	  a	  low	  
price	  to	  attract	  more	  customers.	  Performing	  sensitivity	  analysis	  however	  shows	  that	  a	  
decrease	  of	   initial	  market	  share	  by	  14%	  can	  change	  the	  strategy	  to	  LH	  (ISP	  low,	  OTT	  
high,	  see	  further).	  
If	  DPI	  equipment	  is	  prohibited	  (thus	  if	  net	  neutrality	  is	  obliged	  by	  law),	  the	  ISP	  will	  not	  
upgrade	   its	   network	   if	   he	   is	   only	   interested	   in	   maximizing	   its	   short-­‐term	   NPV.	  
However,	   the	   results	  of	   the	  network	  upgrade	   scenario	   show	   that	   the	   ISP	   can	  easily	  
pay	   the	   upgrade	   investment	   using	   the	   revenues	   from	   its	   current	   customer	   base.	  
Furthermore,	   if	   the	   ISP	   adopts	   a	   longer-­‐term	   strategy,	   they	  will	   shift	   to	   a	   low	  price	  
strategy	  in	  order	  not	  to	  loose	  too	  many	  customers.	  
3.7 Sensitivity	  analysis	  
From	  the	  discussion	  of	   the	   results	  obtained	  above,	   it	   is	   clear	   that,	  although	  general	  
trends	  will	   remain	   the	  same,	  some	  results	   strongly	  depend	  on	  the	  used	  parameters	  





describe	   the	   results	   of	   some	   sensitivity	   studies,	   where	   the	   values	   of	   dedicated	  
parameters	  were	  varied	  to	  investigate	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  result.	  
3.7.1 Price	  
Variations	  in	  VOD	  subscription	  fee	  of	  both	  operators	  led	  to	  the	  following	  results.	  	  
First,	  the	  price	  of	  the	  ISP	  is	  varied,	  while	  keeping	  the	  price	  of	  the	  OTT	  constant	  (low).	  
A	  decrease	  in	  ISP	  pricing	  leads	  to	  no	  changes	  in	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium,	  as	  the	  ISP	  will	  
always	  take	  the	  highest	  price	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  fixed	  OTT	  price.	  An	  increase	  in	  ISP	  
price,	  will	  shift	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  to	  HH	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  ISP	  price	  reaches	  €276.	  At	  
this	  moment,	  the	  difference	  between	  ISP	  and	  OTT	  price	  is	  again	  significant	  enough	  to	  
make	  the	  OTT	  gain	  all	  free	  customers.	  
When	  varying	  the	  price	  of	  the	  OTT,	  assuming	  a	  fixed	  ISP	  price	  (both	  high	  and	  low),	  the	  
analysis	  shows	  an	  optimal	  price	  setting	  for	  the	  OTT:	  the	  price	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  still	  
attracts	  all	   customers	  and	  gains	  maximal	  profit	   from	  each	  customer.	   Increasing	   this	  
optimal	  price	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  lower	  amount	  of	  customers,	  decreasing	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  lower	  
profit	  per	  customers.	  The	  optimal	  price	  for	  the	  OTT	  is	  approached	  equal	  to	  half	  of	  the	  
ISP	  price.	  
3.7.2 Initial	  market	  shares	  
When	   decreasing	   the	   initial	   market	   share	   of	   the	   ISP	   (assuming	   the	   OTT	   is	   already	  
present	  on	  the	  market),	  the	  strategic	  combination	  will	  shift	  to	  HH	  (ISP	  high,	  OTT	  high)	  
if	   the	   ISP	   only	   has	   an	   initial	  market	   share	   of	   93%	   instead	   of	   100%.	  When	   its	   initial	  
market	  share	   is	  assumed	  to	  be	  85%	  or	   lower,	   the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  shifts	  to	  LH:	  the	  
ISP	  will	  assume	  a	  low	  price	  to	  attract	  more	  customers,	  while	  the	  OTT	  gains	  sufficient	  
revenue	  from	  the	  customers	  that	  already	  subscribed.	  
3.7.3 Congestion	  cost	  
Varying	  the	  congestion	  cost	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  total	  available	  market	  (market	  
growth	  or	  decline).	  However,	  varying	  the	  congestion	  cost	  between	  50%	  and	  200%	  of	  
its	   original	   value	   (exponential	   function	   depending	   on	   available	   versus	   needed	  
bandwidth,	   see	   section	   2.1)	   does	   not	   change	   the	   equilibriums.	   Increasing	   the	  
congestion	   cost	   to	   200%	  will	   lead	   to	   a	   decrease	   in	  market	   share	   of	   about	   16%	   for	  
both	   players,	   lowering	   the	   congestion	   cost	   to	   50%	   leads	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   market	  
share	  of	  8%	  and	  15%	  for	  the	  ISP	  and	  OTT	  respectively.	  
4 Conclusions	  and	  future	  work	  
The	  concept	  of	  net	  neutrality	  does	  not	  allow	  ISPs	  to	  differentiate	  the	  traffic	  on	  their	  
network.	  Both	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  net	  neutrality	  have	  valid	  arguments,	  and	  
regulatory	  discussion	  seems	  to	  lead	  to	  different	  results	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  





increasing	  bandwidth	  demands	  of	  OTT	  applications	  are	  growing	  beyond	  their	  ability	  
to	   invest	   in	   new	   networks.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	   want	   to	   block	   or	   throttle	   certain	  
bandwidth-­‐hungry	   applications	   to	   keep	   their	   networks	   free	   of	   congestion.	   The	  
proponents	  of	  net	  neutrality	  are	  the	  OTT	  providers:	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  ISPs	  have	  no	  
right	   to	   manage	   the	   network	   traffic	   based	   on	   content,	   source	   or	   destination,	   and	  
furthermore	   argue	   that	   the	   ISPs	   can	   easily	   pay	   their	   network	   expansions	   using	   the	  
revenues	  they	  gain	  from	  their	  Internet	  subscriptions.	  
Based	   on	   recent	   discussions	   in	   net	   neutrality	   lawmaking,	   this	   paper	   identified	   five	  
scenarios	   that	   were	   evaluated	   using	   a	   combination	   of	   a	   market	   model	   and	   game-­‐
theoretic	  approach:	  
-­‐ Basic	  Net	  Neutrality:	  this	  is	  the	  current	  network	  with	  a	  NN	  obligation.	  The	  
ISP	  will	   not	  upgrade	  his	  network,	  which	   results	   in	   congestion	  problems	  as	  
applications	  require	  more	  bandwidth	  over	  time.	  	  
-­‐ Network	  upgrade:	   the	   ISP	   invests	   in	  upgrading	   its	  network	  upgrade	  to	  get	  
rid	  of	  congestion.	  	  	  
-­‐ Service	  access	  fee:	  the	  ISP	  installs	  DPI	  equipment	  to	  identify	  OTT	  customers	  
and	  charge	  them	  an	  extra	  fee.	  	  
-­‐ Dominant	  ISP:	  by	  installing	  Deep	  Packet	  Inspection	  (DPI)	  equipment,	  the	  ISP	  
can	   give	   his	   customers	   all	   the	   bandwidth	   they	   need	   and	   leave	   only	   the	  
remainder	   to	   the	   OTT	   customers,	   resulting	   in	  massive	   congestion	   for	   the	  
latter.	  	  
-­‐ Preferential	   distribution:	   the	   ISP	   uses	   half	   of	   his	   bandwidth	   capacity	   to	  
create	   a	   fast	   lane	   on	   his	   network.	   Customers	   who	   are	   willing	   to	   pay	   the	  
preferential	   distribution	   fee	   receive	   access	   to	   this	   fast	   lane.	   Normal	  
customers	  will	  suffer	  more	  congestion.	  	  
The	   results	   of	   the	   analysis	   showed	   that,	   under	   the	   assumptions	   made	   for	   the	  
analyzed	  case	  of	  competition	  between	  Telenet	  and	  Netflix	  in	  the	  Flemish	  market,	  the	  
equilibrium	  for	  all	  scenarios	  was	  reached	  when	  the	  ISP	  assumed	  a	  high	  price	  and	  the	  
OTT	  a	   low	  price.	  Furthermore,	  the	  results	   indicated	  a	  strong	  increase	  in	  ISP	  revenue	  
for	   all	   non-­‐NN	   scenarios,	   with	   the	   dominant	   ISP	   scenario	   even	   leading	   to	   the	   OTT	  
having	  to	  leave	  the	  market.	  When	  NN	  is	  obliged	  by	  law	  and	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  ISP	  is	  
short-­‐term	  profit	  maximization,	  the	  ISP	  would	  rather	  lower	  its	  price	  than	  upgrade	  its	  
network.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   regulator,	   aiming	   at	   market	   uptake	  
maximization,	  the	  scenario	  of	  net	  neutrality	  with	  network	  upgrade	  is	  preferable.	  
Future	  work	  first	  of	  all	  includes	  extending	  the	  case	  study	  to	  more	  markets,	  in	  order	  to	  
better	   underpin	   the	   results.	   Sensitivity	   analysis	   can	   be	   carried	   out	   on	   more	  
parameters,	  again	  to	  improve	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  results.	  The	  offer	  by	  both	  players	  





also	  be	  adjusted.	  If	  the	  game	  can	  be	  made	  dynamic,	  where	  all	  players	  can	  adjust	  their	  
strategies	   each	   year,	   the	   dependence	   of	   the	   results	   on	   the	   start	   assumptions	   (e.g.	  
100%	  of	  the	  available	  market	  for	  the	  ISP	  in	  year	  0)	  could	  be	  eliminated,	  as	  the	  game	  
can	  be	  re-­‐iterated	  yearly.	  Finally,	  the	  game	  can	  be	  played	  with	  more	  than	  two	  market	  
players,	  both	  at	  ISP	  and	  OTT	  side,	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effect	  of	  competition	  on	  the	  ISP	  or	  
OTT	  specific	  markets.	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